The Vulnerability of Minority Homeowners in the Housing Boom and Bust by Bayer, Patrick et al.
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Real Estate Papers Wharton Faculty Research
2-2016
The Vulnerability of Minority Homeowners in the





Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/real-estate_papers
Part of the Real Estate Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/real-estate_papers/28
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bayer, P., Ferreira, F. V., & Ross, S. L. (2016). The Vulnerability of Minority Homeowners in the Housing Boom and Bust. American
Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 8 (1), 1-27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20140074
The Vulnerability of Minority Homeowners in the Housing Boom and
Bust
Abstract
This paper examines mortgage outcomes for a large sample of individual home purchases and refinances
linked to credit scores in seven major US markets. Among those with similar credit scores and loan attributes,
black and Hispanic homeowners had much higher rates of delinquency and default in the downturn. These
estimated differences are especially pronounced for loans originated near the peak of the housing boom. These
findings suggest that black and Hispanic homeowners drawn into the market near the peak were especially
vulnerable to adverse economic shocks and raise concerns about homeownership as a mechanism for
reducing racial disparities in wealth.
Disciplines
Real Estate
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/real-estate_papers/28
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2016, 8(1): 1–27 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20140074
1
The Vulnerability of Minority Homeowners  
in the Housing Boom and Bust†
By Patrick Bayer, Fernando Ferreira, and Stephen L. Ross*
This paper examines mortgage outcomes for a large sample of 
individual home purchases and refinances linked to credit scores in 
seven major US markets. Among those with similar credit scores and 
loan attributes, black and Hispanic homeowners had much higher 
rates of delinquency and default in the downturn. These estimated 
differences are especially pronounced for loans originated near 
the peak of the housing boom. These findings suggest that black 
and Hispanic homeowners drawn into the market near the peak 
were especially vulnerable to adverse economic shocks and raise 
concerns about homeownership as a mechanism for reducing racial 
disparities in wealth. (JEL D14, J15, R23, R31, R38)
“We’re creating… an ownership society in this country, where more 
Americans than ever will be able to open up their door where they live and 
say, welcome to my house, welcome to my piece of property.” 
 —President George W. Bush, October 2004
Owning a home has long been viewed as an important mechanism for creating and storing wealth. Yet purchasing a home has traditionally required a substan-
tial down payment, limiting access to those with a sufficient amount of initial capi-
tal (Englehart 1996 and Brueckner 1986). Motivated by this perspective, a number 
of public policy programs have had an explicit goal of expanding homeownership 
and many politicians have embraced it as a means of upward mobility.1 Moreover, 
many commentators have argued that relaxing down payment constraints would 
help reduce large racial and ethnic gaps in homeownership and, ultimately, lead to a 
1 Belsky, Retsinas, and Duda (2005); Herbert et al. (2005); and Quercia, McCarthy, and Wachter (2003) describe 
efforts to reduce down payment requirements for low-income borrowers, and Di and Liu (2007) find evidence of a 
reduction in the importance of household wealth in the transition to homeownership in recent years. 
* Bayer: Department of Economics, Duke University and National Bureau of Economics (NBER), Box 90097, 
Durham, NC 27708 (e-mail: patrick.bayer@duke.edu); Ferreira: The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 
(and NBER), 1466 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104 (e-mail: fferreir@whar-
ton.upenn.edu); Ross: Department of Economics, University of Connecticut, 341 Mansfield Rd, Storrs, CT 06269 
(e-mail: stephen.l.ross@uconn.edu). The authors thank the Ford Foundation, Research Sponsors Program of the 
Zell/Lurie Real Estate Center at Wharton, and the Center for Real Estate and Urban Economic Studies at the 
University of Connecticut for financial support. We thank Robert Avery and Erik Hurst for providing detailed com-
ments on the paper, as well as the participants in the 2012 January meetings of the Weimer School for Advanced 
Studies in Real Estate, the NBER Summer Institute, and the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. Gordon MacDonald, 
Kyle Mangum, and Yuan Wang provided outstanding research assistance. The analyses presented in this paper use 
information provided by Experian Information Solutions, Inc. Experian is a service mark and registered trademark 
of Experian Information Solutions, Inc. However, the substantive content of the paper is the responsibility of the 
authors and does not reflect the specific views of any credit reporting agencies. 
† Go to http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20140074 to visit the article page for additional materials and author 
disclosure statement(s) or to comment in the online discussion forum.
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reduction in racial and ethnic inequality (Rohe, Van Zandt, and MacCarthy 2002). In 
fact, racial and ethnic disparities in wealth dwarf those in income. In 1998, for exam-
ple, the median wealth of black and Hispanic renters was less than $3,000 dollars 
and the seventy-fifth percentile wealth was below $10,000 (Herbert et al. 2005).2
The expansion of housing credit from the late 1990s to mid-2000s led to histor-
ically high rates of homeownership in the United States for all households, includ-
ing a peak of 49.7 percent in 2004:II for blacks and of 50.1 percent in 2007:I for 
Hispanics, and this increase in homeownership was largely cheered. But as the sub-
sequent housing and economic crises developed, however, the risks of homeowner-
ship became increasingly obvious. Delinquency and foreclosure rates rose sharply, 
especially in low-income neighborhoods, and many households not only lost sub-
stantial housing wealth but also faced the prospect of lower credit scores (higher 
borrowing costs) for years to come. A comparison of mortgage delinquencies and 
foreclosures between 2005 and 2009 provides a particularly stark picture of the 
differential impact of the downturn by race and ethnicity. Figure 1 shows that while 
all homeowners had negligible 90-day delinquency and foreclosure rates in 2005 
for our sample of seven major markets, high rates of delinquency and foreclosure 
and large racial and ethnic differences had emerged by 2009. More than one in ten 
black and Hispanic homeowners in our sample had a delinquent mortgage by 2009, 
compared to 1 in 25 for white households, and a similar pattern held for foreclosure 
rates. By 2010, homeownership rates had fallen to 45.6 percent for blacks and 47.5 
percent for Hispanics.
While researchers have documented the greater exposure of minority house-
holds to employment, income, and health shocks (see, for example, Smith 1995; 
Altonji and Blank 1999; Shapiro 2004; Shuey and Wilson 2008; and Hoynes, Miller, 
and Schaller 2012), much less is known about the differential impact of credit and 
financial shocks, especially in housing markets. We tackle this issue by examining 
mortgage outcomes by race during the last housing cycle in a diverse set of US 
housing markets. The main goal of our analysis is to properly estimate the differen-
tial delinquency and default by minority homeowners in the housing market bust, 
accounting for observed differences in credit worthiness, loan characteristics, other 
demographics, house type, neighborhood, and lender type, such as prime and sub-
prime lending.3
Moreover, we test another explanation for high rates of negative credit market 
outcomes for minority homeowners during the crisis, i.e., the selection of  high-risk 
2 Oliver and Shapiro (1997) also estimate that the financial assets and net worth of black households nearing 
retirement (aged 50–64) were only 14 and 20 percent of those of white households, respectively, while the analo-
gous figure for income was 67 percent. Also see Deng, Ross, and Wachter (2003); Gyourko, Linneman, Wachter 
(1999); Duca and Rosenthal (1994); Wachter and Megbolugbe (1992); and Linneman and Wachter (1989) on the 
role of borrowing constraints in explaining the black-white homeownership gap. 
3 The literature also suggests that subprime lending has been an important factor in explaining rising foreclo-
sure rates in low income and minority neighborhoods. Gerardi and Willen (2009); Reid and Laderman (2009); 
Edminston (2009); and Wachter, Russo, and Hershaff (2010) show that the housing market crisis and the preced-
ing growth of subprime lending have disproportionately affected low income and minority neighborhoods. More 
broadly, Mian and Sufi (2009) document large increases in foreclosure rates in neighborhoods that had a large 
volume of subprime loans and that this growth in subprime loans occurred primarily in neighborhoods with very 
low income growth. 
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households into the housing market close to the peak of the housing cycle. If 
we recognize that households sort into owner-occupancy in part due to both the 
cost/difficulty of obtaining mortgage credit and the risk of exposure to future adverse 
events, then, for a given cost of credit, households with low risk of adverse events 
will be more likely to be homeowners. As the cost of credit falls or the availability of 
credit expands, more households will become homeowners, and the newest home-
owners will be drawn from the remaining high risk pool. To the extent that wealth 
and liquidity gaps leave minority households especially vulnerable to negative eco-
nomic shocks, we expect that those minority households drawn into homeownership 
following a major expansion of credit are especially likely to default in a subsequent 
economic downturn.4
There are significant empirical challenges to studying mortgage outcomes by 
race and ethnicity. Most directly, datasets linking home purchases and mortgage 
decisions by race to detailed risk factors and subsequent loan performance for a rep-
resentative sample of homeowners have been essentially nonexistent. Most research 
documenting the distribution and performance of high cost or subprime loans have 
used one of two sources: Analyses using Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) 
data (Calem, Gillen, and Wachter 2004; Avery, Canner, and Cooke 2005; and Apgar, 
Calder, and Fauth 2004) typically find significant racial and ethnic differences in the 
4 For example, Charles and Hurst (2002) suggests that black households may have fewer family resources to 
draw on; particularly, they document that, conditional on credit score and income, young black adults are less likely 






































Figure 1. Unconditional Rates of Mortgage Foreclosures and Delinquencies by Race and Year
notes: The figure presents the mean number of 90-day to 180-day mortgage delinquencies and the mean number 
of foreclosures within the last 12 months by group for each credit report year pooling both the home purchase and 
refinance samples. Each line represents a different group.
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allocation of high cost credit, but these studies can only control for the extremely 
limited borrower and loan attributes in HMDA; and proprietary data aggregated 
across many lenders (Mayer and Pence 2008; Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund 2009; 
Reid and Laderman 2009; and Fisher, Lambie-Hanson, and Willen 2010) often 
capture only a select subset of the mortgage market and typically do not contain 
information on borrower race or ethnicity instead documenting differences at the 
neighborhood level.
We overcome these issues by first assembling a unique panel dataset that links a 
representative sample of HMDA data on home purchase and refinance mortgages 
originated between May and August in the years between 2004 and 2008, to public 
records data on housing transactions and liens for approximately 270,000 home-
owners in seven distinct metropolitan housing markets: Chicago, IL Consolidated 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA); Cleveland, OH Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(MSA); Denver, CO MSA; Los Angeles, CA CMSA; Miami-Palm Beach corridor; 
San Francisco, CA CMSA; and Washington DC-Baltimore MD suburban corridor. 
These data contain information on all liens as well as the name and address of the 
individual purchasing the housing unit or refinancing their mortgage and in many 
cases the name of the individual’s spouse, in addition to information about house 
prices, housing characteristics, and neighborhood or census tract of the housing unit.
We then provided this rich sample to one of the major credit rating agencies. The 
credit rating agency used the name and address to match borrowers to archival credit 
reporting data, providing in each year a Vantage credit score plus detailed credit 
line information from each individual’s report. This matched  mortgage-housing 
 unit-credit data provides detailed information on the financial circumstances of each 
homeowner at the time of mortgage origination, the terms of the mortgage includ-
ing whether it was a high-cost loan, and the performance of the mortgage over the 
subsequent years.5
Our data has three critical advantages relative to other data that has been ana-
lyzed in the recent literature. First, all of the information is matched at the indi-
vidual rather than neighborhood level. This allows us to examine how the pricing 
and performance of loans varies with the race of the homeowner separately from 
the racial composition of the neighborhood. Second, our dataset includes a repre-
sentative sample of all mortgages that were originated in these markets in the time 
period. Finally, our dataset contains controls for all of the standard risk factors that 
are typically considered in mortgage underwriting and pricing models.
Our empirical results show that black and Hispanic households are more likely 
to become delinquent and default on their mortgages than white households with 
similar credit scores, loan characteristics, demographics, house type, neighborhood, 
and lender. Blacks are 3.0 and 1.5 percentage points more likely to enter foreclo-
sure than whites in our home purchase and refinance samples, respectively; while 
Hispanics are 3.1 and 2.1 percentage points more likely to enter foreclosure in the 
5 Bhutta and Canner (2013) provide the one exception in the literature that documents racial and ethnic differ-
ences in foreclosure controlling for borrower credit scores by merging HMDA data with data from a credit reporting 
agency, but they are only able to control for the overall amount of the primary mortgage because they do not observe 
either subordinate debt or the value of the home securing that debt. 
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same samples. These differences are substantial relative to the unconditional 5.2 and 
3.7 percent average foreclosure rates in the home purchase and refinance samples, 
and represent approximately one-third of the unconditional racial and ethnic differ-
ences in the home purchase samples and one-half of the unconditional differences in 
the refinance sample. Most of this decline in the unconditional racial and ethnic dif-
ferences arise from including general controls for observable mortgage-risk factors 
in our econometric model, as opposed to controls associated with subprime lending.
Next, we include in our model a series of contemporaneous controls that represent 
information that may not have been available to the lender at the time of mortgage 
origination. These controls include county by credit year fixed effects, contempora-
neous measures of negative equity based on county-level price indices, and the inter-
action of the negative equity variables with race and ethnicity specific measures of 
county employment rates. These controls decrease conditional racial differences in 
foreclosure by approximately 50 percent and decrease conditional ethnic differences 
in foreclosure by between 10 and 20 percent. The decline in racial and ethnic differ-
ences arises entirely from the use of race specific employment rates. Controlling for 
county-level employment rates does not erode the racial and ethnic differences in 
foreclosure. The foreclosure and delinquency differences are explained by the lower 
rates of employment among blacks, and to some extent Hispanics, and the higher 
rates of foreclosure among all households with negative equity and in counties with 
low employment rates for their group.
We then attempt to identify which borrowers are responsible for the observed 
racial and ethnic differences in delinquency and foreclosure. For African American 
homebuyers, we find that all racial differences are concentrated among borrowers 
with subprime credit scores and high debt expense to income ratios. Ethnic differ-
ences are somewhat higher for high debt expense to income ratio loans, but sub-
prime credit does not seem to matter. Furthermore, ethnic differences in foreclosure 
are concentrated among Hispanic borrowers in counties with low employment rates 
for Hispanics. While as noted earlier within county employment rate differences 
between Hispanics and whites does not explain ethnic differences, the effect of 
exposure to low employment rates has a much larger effect on Hispanic homeowners 
than on white homeowners. A similar, but more modest phenomenon, is observed 
for black homeowners. The larger impact of county-level employment rates on the 
foreclosure risk of minority borrowers is consistent with those borrowers being less 
able to manage the economic distress created by economic downturns, even after 
controlling for differential exposure to loans with risky terms and contemporaneous 
levels of negative equity and employment risk.
We already noted that recent home purchases have higher foreclosure and delin-
quency rates than the refinance sample—which by definition are composed of 
homeowners that were drawn into the housing market much earlier. As a final test 
of our hypothesis concerning the vulnerability of recent minority homebuyers, we 
examine whether the timing of the selection into the housing market has an effect 
on delinquency and foreclosure. We find that racial and ethnic differences are larg-
est for home purchase originations in 2006, the peak of the housing boom accord-
ing to the Case-Shiller price index, even after controlling for the subsequent higher 
rates of negative equity for borrowers who purchased near the peak of the housing 
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market. The pattern is similar, but less strong, for the refinance sample. We also 
examine racial and ethnic differences for a subsample of refinance mortgages that 
were originally purchased between 1998 and 2008 and subsequently refinanced in 
our sample period. For this subsample, racial and ethnic differences in foreclosure 
are tiny for homes that were originally purchased from 1998 to 2000, but substantial 
for homeowners who originally purchased their homes between 2001 and 2007, 
i.e., those drawn into the market during the credit expansion, with the largest effects 
arising between 2004 and 2007. These home purchase timing effects are largest for 
minority borrowers with high debt-to-income ratios and who are exposed to low 
employment rates.
Taken together, our results provide strong evidence that minority households 
drawn into homeownership late in the recent housing market boom were especially 
vulnerable in the subsequent downturn in ways that are not explained by borrower 
characteristics observed at origination, exposure to different lenders or loans, and 
performance of local labor and housing markets. These results call into question 
the idea of encouraging homeownership as a general mechanism for reducing racial 
disparities in wealth. To the extent that increases in homeownership are driven by 
the entry of especially vulnerable households into the owner-occupied market, such 
a push may backfire, leaving vulnerable households in a difficult financial situation 
and adversely affecting their wealth and credit-worthiness for years.
There are important caveats to our results. First, we do not directly observe house-
hold savings or wealth, which might help to explain why some households are able 
to manage adverse economic shocks more easily than others. Future work could 
more explicitly measure whether the estimated differences in mortgage outcomes 
by race reported here are primarily due to differences in wealth. Another limitation 
of our analysis is that our study period only covers the recent housing crisis. While 
Hoynes, Miller, and Schaller (2012) show similar patterns by race for negative labor 
market shocks in a number of recent recessions, there is a chance that the recent 
housing market boom and bust may be unique in history.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the 
data used in the analysis. Section II presents the main results from our analyses of 
credit outcomes, and Section III shows heterogeneity in those estimates. Section IV 
presents additional analyses by the year of mortgage origination or home purchase. 
Section V concludes.
I. Data
Our dataset is based on public Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data 
from between 2004 and 2008 and proprietary housing transaction/lien and asses-
sor’s databases purchased from DataQuick.6 We begin with a convenience sample of 
seven major housing markets where DataQuick has information on refinance mort-
gages going back to at least 2004: Chicago, IL CMSA; Cleveland, OH MSA; Denver, 
6 Data provided by DataQuick Information Systems, Inc. www.dataquick.com. The property transaction data is 
collected by DataQuick or by intermediaries from county assessor’s offices and contains a population of all sales 
and liens of all types including refinance mortgages, home improvement loans, and home equity lines of credit. 
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CO MSA; Los Angeles, CA CMSA; Miami-Palm Beach corridor; San Francisco, 
CA CMSA; and Washington DC-Baltimore MD suburban corridor. We restrict our 
HMDA data to home purchase or refinance mortgages on  owner-occupied, 1–4 fam-
ily properties. In the DataQuick sample, we eliminate non-arm’s length transactions, 
transactions where the name field contains the name of a church, trust, or where the 
first name is missing, and transactions where the address could not be matched to 
a 2000 census tract or the zip code was missing (this last step eliminates very few 
records due to the high quality of the name and address records in the assessor files). 
The HMDA and DataQuick data are then merged based on year, loan amount, name 
of lender, state, county, and census tract. We obtain high quality matches for approx-
imately 50 percent of our HMDA sample. As we show in Table 1, this criteria does 
not impact the representativeness of our final sample.
Next, we draw a sample of mortgages to provide to a credit-reporting agency. 
These mortgages were sampled from May through August so that the March 31 
archival credit report for the year of the mortgage provides appropriate informa-
tion on the borrowers’ credit quality prior to obtaining the mortgage. We oversam-
ple mortgages to minority borrowers, mortgages to white borrowers in minority or 
low-income neighborhoods, and high cost mortgages as designated in HMDA as 
high rate spread loans. In order to maximize the number of minority loans given the 
likelihood of sample saturation, we first draw the following oversamples based on 
race and ethnicity: 500 in each site, year, and group (400 for 2004)7 selected ran-
domly from mortgages to black borrowers, mortgages to Hispanic borrowers, and 
mortgages to white borrowers in minority or low-income neighborhoods. We then 
split the remaining sample into rate spread and nonrate spread loans drawing 1,000 
borrowers associated with rate spread loans in each year and site (800 for 2004) 
and 2,714 borrowers (2,286 for 2004) from the nonrate spread sample in each year 
and site. Weights are developed based on the probability of selection, and each site 
receives equal weight in the pooled sample.8
This sample is provided to Experian Information Solutions, Inc.,9 who matches 
the name and address of each borrower and co-borrower to archival credit report data 
from March 31 preceding the mortgage transaction and March 31 for every year that 
follows this transaction through 2009. Our match rate for the pre-mortgage archive 
is 81.4 and 84.5 percent in the home purchase and refinance samples, respectively. 
For years following the mortgage, the match rate rises by 4 to 5 percentage points. In 
many cases, these individuals also may not have been found by the credit reporting 
agencies when the lender requested a report, in which case lack of a score matches 
7 The smaller sample in 2004 is driven by budgetary restrictions because costs depend upon the number of 
records, and earlier years imply more records because we follow every borrower from the origination year until 
2009. 
8 The sampling is explicitly based on eight strata for each site: black borrowers, Hispanic borrowers, white 
borrowers in minority or low-income neighborhoods, and all other borrowers divided into rate spread and non-
rate spread loans. All loans from the same strata and year receive equal weight. We have a convenience sample of 
housing markets so it would be inappropriate to weight based on the number of mortgages. In any stratified sam-
pling scheme, Los Angeles, which dominates our sample in terms of total number of HMDA mortgages, would be 
selected with certainty while housing markets like Denver and Cleveland would be assigned to a stratum with other 
similarly sized and located metropolitan areas, and if chosen, would receive a higher weight (offsetting the smaller 
number of mortgages) based on the probability of being selected from the stratum. 
9 Experian is a service mark and registered trademark of Experian Information Solutions, Inc. 
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the information that the lender would have had when approving and pricing the loan, 
but lenders can enter by hand additional information that is not available to us such 
as social security number or previous addresses.10
Table 1 illustrates the impact of our match process on the sample mean on race 
and ethnicity of the borrower, whether the primary mortgage is a high-cost loan or 
rate-spread loan, which is defined as a 3 percentage point or more spread between 
the mortgage Annual Percentage Rate (APR) and the interest rate on ten-year 
treasury notes (the APR includes both the interest or note rate on the loan and the 
effect of closing costs on the cost of credit), loan amount, family income of the bor-
rower, and census tract variables including median income, percent black, Hispanic, 
and Asian residents, and percent of properties owner-occupied. The first column 
shows the mean for the entire HMDA sample for our seven sites where each site 
receives equal weight in the mean. The second column shows the mean for our 
HMDA-DataQuick match, and the third column restricts our sample to mortgages 
between May and August. The fourth column shows the weighted mean for the sam-
ple of mortgages that was provided to the credit reporting agency. The last column in 
Table 1 shows the weighted means on these common variables for just the subsam-
ple where the name and address was matched to the minimum amount of credit line 
data in order to generate a record. The sample composition is quite stable except for 
a moderate decline in share white and moderate increase in loan amount between 
10 For home purchase mortgages, we only observe the address of the new housing unit, but in practice this does 
not present a major problem for the credit data match because the archival data can be matched based on current 
and several past addresses and in practice we observe only a small difference between the home purchases and 
refinance match rate. 





  DQ high 
quality 
match









Black 0.111 0.116 0.114 0.114 0.112
Hispanic 0.174 0.194 0.193 0.192 0.185
Asian 0.075 0.086 0.085 0.086 0.089
White 0.678 0.601 0.605 0.605 0.611
Loan amount (in 1,000s) 247 271 274 274 278
Applicant income (in 1,000s) 107 105 105 106 106
Tract median income (in 1,000s) 59.1 59.6 59.7 59.7 60.4
Tract pct. Black 0.126 0.116 0.115 0.115 0.113
Tract pct. Hispanic 0.169 0.165 0.164 0.165 0.163
Tract pct. Asian 0.063 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.066
Observations 9,345,709   4,002,996   1,459,468   273,589   238,785
notes: This table presents the means for all Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) home purchase and refinance 
mortgages in our seven market areas between 2004 and 2008 where each market is given equal weight in the means. 
The second column presents the means for the subsample where we have a high quality match between HMDA and 
the housing transaction file based on loan amount, type of loan, census tract and lender name, and the third column 
is based on further restricting the sample to mortgages originated between May and August. The fourth column 
presents means for the stratified sample that was merged to the credit history data weighted by the inverse of the 
sampling probabilities again with equal weights for each market, and the fifth column presents weighted means for 
the subsample that was successfully merged to an established credit history prior to mortgage origination. Standard 
deviations are available upon request.
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columns 1 and 2 associated with the difficulty of matching lender names between 
HMDA and the DataQuick provided assessor files. While our HMDA-DataQuick 
match algorithm loses 50 percent of the HMDA mortgages, the composition of the 
match sample is quite similar to the composition of the population of mortgages, 
and the other aspects of our sample construction have virtually no impact on the 
composition of mortgages over key attributes.11
Table 2 shows the weighted means for our final samples of post-mortgage credit 
reports for the home purchase and refinance subsamples that were successfully 
merged to pre-mortgage credit report data.12 The first two columns show the mean 
and standard deviation for our sample of home purchase mortgages, and the last two 
columns show these values for refinance mortgages. From the contemporaneous 
credit history data, we obtain number of 90-day to 180-day mortgage delinquencies 
and foreclosures in the last 12 months. From the pre-mortgage data, we obtain these 
same outcomes prior to the mortgage and the borrowers’ (or if unavailable co-bor-
rower’s) Vantage score. The first credit report observation following the mortgage 
is used to obtain monthly mortgage payment, which when combined with HMDA 
income is used to calculate the mortgage payment to income ratio.13 The monthly 
mortgage payment is combined with debt payments from the pre-mortgage credit 
data and HMDA income to calculate debt payment to income ratio. Finally, age is 
observed for many borrowers and co-borrowers in the credit history files.
The HMDA data contains whether the loan is a high cost or exceeds a standard 
rate spread above treasury rates, borrower race and ethnicity, gender, loan amount, 
applicant income, and whether a co-borrower is present. We use the loan amount 
to calculate whether the loan is nonconforming or a jumbo loan, i.e., too large 
to be purchased by the Government Sponsored Enterprises; and based on census 
tract, we observe tract racial and ethnic composition, income, poverty rate, share 
 owner-occupied, and the value of median rents to median home price, which is 
viewed as a proxy for anticipated housing price appreciation. From the match with 
transaction data, we observe the presence and size of subordinate liens, whether 
the liens are fixed or variable rate mortgages, the loan-to-value ratio based on sales 
price for home purchase mortgages and on an estimated value based on either pre-
vious sales price14 or assessed value for refinance mortgages when a previous sale 
is unobserved,15 and detailed property attributes including whether single family 
home, a condominium, and number of units on the property.
11 The key factor limiting the match rate is the lender name because the lender of record in the local assessor’s 
data often differs from the respondent in HMDA. Less restrictive match criteria can yield a match rate around 
90 percent, but in order to be conservative, we restricted ourselves only to instances where we successfully match 
on lender name. 
12 The sample size in Table 2 is substantially larger than the sample size in the final column of Table 1 because 
each mortgage in Table 1 will have one post mortgage credit report observation for every year between the year after 
origination and the final year of our data in 2009. 
13 The mortgage payment for the current mortgage is only observed in the credit line data from the year follow-
ing the mortgage. However, in most instances, borrowers who are matched by the credit reporting agency prior to 
the mortgage are also matched in the following year. 
14 We use our extensive housing transaction data to develop both a hedonic and repeat sales quarterly price 
index for each county. When we observe a previous sale of the property, we simply adjust that earlier sales price to 
estimate current value based on the hedonic index. However, the repeat sales index yields quite similar estimates. 
15 When a previous sale is not observed, we use the county assessment and adjust that value by the average ratio 
of sales price to assessed value for that county and quarter, see Clapp, Nanda, and Ross (2008). In California, our 
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refinance sample is restricted to mortgages where a previous purchase is observed because property assessments are 
uninformative as to the value of the underlying property. This restriction is feasible because the DataQuick data in 
California contains transactions back to the late 1980s. 
Table 2—Descriptive Statistics
  Purchase sample   Refinance sample
  Mean SD Mean  SD
credit data
Mortgage delinquency 90–180 days 0.035 0.214 0.030 0.196
Foreclosure 0.053 0.319 0.037 0.250
Delinquency prior to mortgage 0.001 0.025 0.002 0.046
Foreclosure prior to mortgage 0.001 0.037 0.006 0.082
Vantage score 781.3 104.0 775.0 109.8
Mortgage payment to income ratio 0.256 0.280 0.247 1.064
Debt payment to income ratio 0.321 0.336 0.348 1.191
Borrower age 27.1 23.1 34.3 24.8
HmDA data  
Rate spread 0.151 0.358 0.168 0.374
American Indian 0.003 0.054 0.003 0.056
Asian 0.097 0.296 0.086 0.280
Black 0.089 0.284 0.126 0.331
Hispanic 0.195 0.397 0.182 0.386
White 0.616 0.486 0.604 0.489
Male 0.643 0.479 0.643 0.479
Female 0.355 0.478 0.355 0.478
Loan amount (in 1,000s) 105.7 106.1 100.6 108.8
Applicant income (in 1,000s) 285.9 210.1 261.6 199.2
Co-borrower present 0.354 0.478 0.476 0.499
Jumbo loan 0.280 0.449 0.189 0.392
Tract median income (in 1,000s) 60.04 23.43 60.44 23.54
Tract share black 0.100 18.340 12.273 21.652
Tract share Hispanic 0.162 20.210 17.116 20.573
Tract share Asian 0.065 10.252 7.107 10.756
Tract share owner occupant 0.683 23.892 69.202 22.749
Tract share in poverty 0.077 7.273 7.962 7.491
Tract rent/price 0.0045 0.0019 0.0044 0.0017
DataQuick data  
Loan-to-value ratio 0.885 0.242 0.576 0.416
Subordinate lien 0.428 0.495 0.016 0.127
First lien adjustable rate 0.515 0.500 0.478 0.500
Condo 0.218 0.413 0.139 0.346
Mobile 0.001 0.035 0.001 0.034
Single family 0.774 0.418 0.837 0.369
Lot size (sf in 1,000s) 15.67 575.97 15.05 397.86
Unit square feet (in 1,000s) 1.80 26.19 1.77 20.12
Number of bathrooms 1.99 6.60 2.00 1.15
Number of bedrooms 2.17 6.85 2.04 1.77
Number of stories 1.17 1.58 1.22 1.33
Units in building 1.41 14.83 1.49 19.88
Sample size 327,124   306,213
notes: The first two columns contain means and standard deviations for our sample of post-mortgage credit reports 
for each home purchase mortgage borrower for which a credit score was observed prior to mortgage origination. 
The last two columns contain the same information for the post-mortgage reports of mortgage refinancers.
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II. Delinquencies and Foreclosures by Race
In this section, we present empirical estimates for models of two housing market 
outcomes, delinquencies, and foreclosures. Each mortgage origination  contributes 
one or more observations based on the origination date. Specifically, the 2004 origi-
nations contribute housing market outcome observations in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
and 2009, while each 2008 origination contributes only a single post-mortgage out-
come for 2009. We write those outcomes  d for individual  i , of race  r , at time of 
origination  s , calendar time  t , and MSA  m , as:
(1)  d irstm = β  r ir + γ  X is +  δ st +  θ m +  ε irstm ,
where r includes dummies for blacks, Hispanics, and Asians, so all estimates are 
relative to white households.  X is includes the set of pre-mortgage origination vari-
ables reported in Table 2.16 Our design relies on the fact that we are controlling for 
almost all characteristics of borrowers, houses, and mortgages that were observable 
by lenders at time of origination. Especially noteworthy is the information about 
credit scores, which in principle means that we will compare housing outcomes 
between blacks and whites, for example, with similar creditworthiness and with 
similar choices of house type, neighborhoods, and loan characteristics. Finally, the 
model also includes year of origination by year of the credit profile indicators  δ st to 
deal with common trends, as well as housing market fixed effects.
Next, we expand our set of underwriting controls  X is to include a variety of vari-
ables intended to capture the potential influence of the subprime mortgage market 
on observed racial and ethnic differences. The extended model includes a dummy 
for whether the loan is a high-cost loan or rate-spread loan, as defined in the data 
section above. Since subprime lending shares are highly concentrated in a subsam-
ple of lenders, we include lender fixed effects, and we also include neighborhood or 
census tract fixed effects because subprime lending is also potentially concentrated 
in certain cities and neighborhoods. Finally, we include additional controls to rec-
ognize that the impact of key loan terms on borrower outcomes may vary between 
prime and subprime borrowers. We identify borrowers with Vantage scores below 
701 as subprime borrowers17 and then interact the subprime dummy with dummy 
variables associated with key thresholds of loan-to-value ratio, debt-to-income ratio, 
and mortgage payment to income ratio,18 as well as with the presence of subordinate 
debt and whether the primary mortgage has a fixed or adjustable interest rate.
16 The loan-to-value ratio is included as intervals or bins below 0.6, 0.6 to 0.8, 0.8 to 0.84, 0.85 to 0.89, 0.90 to 
0.94, 0.95 to 1.00, 1.00 to 1.04, and 1.05 and above. The Vantage scores are included as a series of dummy variables 
based on 20 point bins. The mortgage payment and debt-to-income ratios are also divided into bins. The bins vary 
in size. For mortgage payment to income ratios, the smallest bins are 0.02 around the traditional secondary market 
criteria of 0.28, and for total debt payment to income ratios the smallest bins are 0.03 around the threshold of 0.36. 
17 The credit reporting agencies that developed the Vantage score algorithms describes scores below 701 as 
nonprime. Further, a Vantage score of 701 is comparable to a FICO score of 660 in that in both cases approximately 
30 percent of individuals have credit scores below these thresholds. 
18 The loan-to-value thresholds used are 0.80, 0.90, 0.95, and 1.00; the debt-to-income thresholds used are 0.36 
and 0.45; and the mortgage payment to income ratio thresholds used are 0.28 and 0.33. 
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We also consider a model that includes contemporaneous controls in order to 
capture changes in the economic environment during the sample period
(2)  d irstm = β  r ir + γ  X ist +  δ st +  θ mt +  ε irstm .
Specifically, the model is extended to include housing market by current year fixed 
effects, contemporaneous controls for negative equity, and controls for employ-
ment risk. The controls for negative equity are based on original loan-to-value ratio 
scaled by changes in the price level based on a county-level hedonic price index that 
was estimated using all single family transactions in the county during the sample 
period. We create a dummy for whether the current loan-to-value ratio is between 
1.0 and 1.1, 1.1 and 1.3, 1.3 and 1.5, and above 1.5. The literature on mortgage 
foreclosure and default suggests that the likelihood of foreclosure and the effect of 
negative equity on foreclosure will vary with the employment outcomes of home-
owners. We do not have individual information about employment. Instead, we cre-
ate measures of local employment and unemployment rates for prime age (25–54) 
males for each county, year, and racial/ethnic group using the public use sample 
of the American Community Survey, where the employment rate is calculated as 
the fraction of males in that group who reported being employed last week. We 
interact this employment measure with the negative equity dummy variables. One 
caveat is that Gyourko and Tracy (2013) demonstrate substantial attenuation bias 
in credit outcome models when county-level employment rates are used to proxy 
for actual future employment outcomes. In our case, however, we find that county 
employment rates (at least as a proxy for the risk of unemployment) have strong 
explanatory power for differential rates of mortgage delinquency and foreclosure.
The first and fifth columns of Table 3 present the unconditional racial and ethnic 
differences in 90–180 day mortgage delinquency and in foreclosure filing, respec-
tively, for the samples of home purchase and refinance mortgages. The estimates 
for the home purchase sample are shown in panel A and the estimates for the refi-
nance sample are shown in panel B. We find massive differences for both black and 
Hispanic borrowers of 8.6 and 3.0 for black home purchase and refinance borrowers 
and of 9.1 and 4.3 for Hispanic borrowers in the probability of facing a foreclosure 
filing, as compared to the 5.2 and 3.7 percent average foreclosure rates in the home 
purchase and refinance samples, respectively. Both overall delinquency and fore-
closure rates and racial and ethnic differences in those rates are larger in the home 
purchase sample. One possible explanation for this difference is that, on average, the 
homes in the refinance sample were purchased earlier. Those homeowners may have 
had more time to accumulated housing equity prior to the housing market downturn, 
or were generally less vulnerable to housing shocks. We will explore the timing of 
house purchase in more detail in Section IV.
The next two columns of estimates for the delinquency and foreclosure models 
include first the detailed underwriting variables, and then in the next column those 
controls plus the additional controls for subprime lending, including the lender and 
neighborhood fixed effects (see Appendix Tables A1 and A2 for a complete list of 
parameter estimates). Blacks are 3.0 and 1.5 percentage points more likely to enter 
foreclosure than comparable whites in our home purchase and refinance  samples, 
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respectively; while comparable Hispanics are 3.1 and 2.1 percentage points more 
likely to enter foreclosure than whites in the same samples after controlling for risk 
factors observable at the time of the loan. Comparing columns 1 and 5 to columns 3 
and 7 indicates that these differences represent approximately one-third of the uncon-
ditional racial and ethnic differences in the home purchase sample and one-half of 
the unconditional differences in the refinance sample. For both samples, both out-
come variables, and both groups, the main erosion of racial and ethnic differences in 
credit market outcomes arises from the inclusion of standard underwriting controls. 
The inclusion of lender and neighborhood fixed effects and additional controls for 
subprime lending had almost no effect on the estimated racial and ethnic differences 
with one exception. The control for whether the loan was high cost or a rate spread 
loan accounts for the entire reduction in the estimates between columns 2 and 3 and 
columns 6 and 7 (see Appendix Table A2). Significantly, the effect associated with 
having a high cost loan cannot simply arise from the higher mortgage payments 
associated with these loans because our model contains detailed controls for the 
housing and total debt expense to income ratios faced by households. Estimates for 
Asians are also statistically significant, but substantially smaller than the differences 
observed for African Americans and Hispanics and not economically meaningful.
Table 3—Estimated Differences in Mortgage Outcomes—Delinquency and Foreclosure Rates
Delinquency Foreclosure
Race Unconditional Underwriting Subprime
Contempor-
aneous Unconditional Underwriting Subprime
Contempor-
aneous
Panel A. Home purchase sample
Black 0.060*** 0.030*** 0.023*** 0.015*** 0.086*** 0.042*** 0.030*** 0.017***
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Hispanic 0.054*** 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.091*** 0.038*** 0.031*** 0.025***
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Sample size 331,608 331,608 331,608 330,912 331,608 331,608 331,608 330,912
r2 0.013 0.057 0.098 0.108 0.016 0.074 0.122 0.137
Panel B. refinance sample
Black 0.030*** 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.005** 0.030*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.007**
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002608) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Hispanic 0.031*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.043*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.019***
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Sample size 309,137 309,137 309,137 308,459 309,137 309,137 309,137 308,459
r2 0.005 0.046 0.090 0.096 0.005 0.045 0.095 0.102
notes: This table presents the estimates for number of 90-day and 180-day mortgage delinquencies and number of 
foreclosures within the last 12 months for the samples described in Table 2 based on the home purchase and refi-
nance samples, panels A and B, respectively. The first column for each outcome presents unconditional differences, 
the second column presents results conditional on detailed controls for pre-origination Vantage credit score, loan to 
value ratio, mortgage and total debt payment to income ratios, whether interest rate is adjustable, presence of sub-
ordinate debt, whether a jumbo loan, borrower income, race, ethnicity, gender, age, presence of coborrower, census 
tract demographics and detailed unit attributes, as well as origination year by credit year fixed effects. The third col-
umn presents estimates after adding controls for rate spread loans, lender fixed effects, tract fixed effects, and addi-
tional subprime controls, and the fourth column presents estimates after adding county-by-year fixed effects plus 
contemporaneous controls for negative equity and employment rates. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to 
heteroskedasticity, and clustered at tract-credit year level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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The final pair of columns, columns 4 and 8, in Table 3 presents the estimates for 
models that include a series of contemporaneous controls that represent information 
that may not have been available to the lender at the time of mortgage origination. 
These controls further erode the delinquency and foreclosure differences decreasing 
racial differences in foreclosure by approximately 50 percent and decreasing ethnic 
differences in foreclosure by between 10 and 20 percent. The decline in racial and 
ethnic differences arises entirely from the use of race-specific employment rates. 
Racial and ethnic differences are essentially unchanged in models that simply con-
trol for county by year fixed effects or control for the overall county-level employ-
ment rate.19 The foreclosure and delinquency differences that were not explained by 
standard mortgage-risk variables are in substantial part explained by the lower rates 
of employment among blacks during the recent crisis, and to some extent among 
Hispanics, and the higher rates of foreclosure among all households with negative 
equity and in counties with low employment rates for their group.20
As noted above, racial and ethnic differences in delinquency and foreclosure 
in the refinance are smaller than the comparable differences in the home purchase 
sample. Racial and ethnic differences continue to be higher in the home purchase 
sample even after controlling for mortgage-risk factors. Further, in columns 4 and 8, 
the larger differences in the home purchase sample cannot be explained simply by 
the increased time available to homeowners in the refinance sample to accumulate 
housing equity prior to the crisis because these models explicitly control for current 
loan-to-value ratios. On the other hand, since foreclosure rates in general are higher 
in the home purchase sample, the unexplained differences are a larger share of the 
unconditional racial and ethnic differences in the refinance sample than in the home 
purchase sample. In columns 3 and 7, where we control for mortgage-risk factors, 
racial and ethnic differences are about one-third of the average rate of foreclosure 
in the home purchase sample, and one-half of the average rate of foreclosure for the 
refinance sample. For the models that control for contemporaneous factors, the pat-
tern is the same, but the relative magnitude of the unexplained differences are much 
smaller for the home purchase sample.
III. Heterogeneity in the Race Differentials
We first present the time pattern of these race differentials in Figure 2. We esti-
mate these parameters by interacting the race dummies with calendar year indica-
tors. The top panel of the figure shows racial and ethnic differences for the home 
purchase sample and the bottom panel of the figure shows these differences for 
the refinance sample. Each figure contains four lines representing the racial differ-
ences in each year unconditionally (circle), conditional on traditional risk factors 
19 Whether race-specific or overall-county employment rates are used in the model, the estimates indicate that 
negative equity and employment rates have powerful and interactive effects. The estimates on the negative equity 
dummy variables are large and positive, while the estimates on the interactions with employment rate are nega-
tive and similar in magnitude suggesting that being in negative equity has little or no effect on foreclosure when 
employment rates are high, but becomes increasingly important as employment rates fall. See Appendix Table A3. 
20 The r2 for these models are not very high in large part because future adverse outcomes are heavily driven 
by events that happen after the borrower obtains their mortgage, but also because the fit of linear models tends to 
be lower when events are infrequent. 
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 (diamond), conditional on subprime controls (square), and conditional on contem-
poraneous controls (triangle). While the inclusion of additional controls erodes the 
level of racial and ethnic differences, the pattern is the same overall for all models 
and both groups. Racial and ethnic differences are relatively small or nonexistent 
beginning in 2005, and then grow rapidly as the crisis proceeds, typically peaking at 
the end of our sample in 2009.
Unconditional model
Add subprime controls
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Figure 2. Black and Hispanic Probability of Foreclosure Relative to Whites by Calendar Year,  
Home Purchase, and Refinance Samples
notes: The figure presents estimated group differences in the number of foreclosures within the last 12 months by 
credit report year separately for the home purchase and refinance samples. Each line represents the estimated differ-
ences for a unique model based on a specific set of regression controls as discussed in relation to Table 3.
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Next we attempt to identify which borrowers are responsible for the observed 
racial and ethnic differences in delinquency and foreclosure. In order to accom-
plish this, we reestimate the final models in Table 3, columns 4 and 8, including 
 interactions with key risk factors. We consider three mortgage-risk factors by inter-
acting race and ethnicity with dummy variables for whether the borrower has a 
subprime credit score (Vantage score below 701), whether the loan is a high cost or 
rate spread loan, and whether the debt expense to income ratio is above levels that 
were required during this time to be considered for purchase by the Government 
Sponsored Enterprises, FreddieMac, and Fannie Mae (a ratio above 0.45). We also 
estimate models interacting the race and ethnicity dummies with one minus the 
group specific, county-level employment rate described above. The models use 
one minus the employment rate so that the estimated coefficients on the black and 
Hispanic dummy variables are for racial and ethnic differences where employment 
rates are 100 percent, as opposed to 0 percent, which would be far out of the sample 
range.
These estimates are shown in Table 4 with the results for the home purchase sam-
ple presented in panel 1 and for the refinance sample in panel 2. Columns 1 and 4 
present the baseline results from columns 4 and 8 in Table 3. Columns 2 and 5 pres-
ent the results where race and ethnicity is interacted with the mortgage-risk factors. 
For blacks, racial differences in foreclosure and delinquency are higher in the home 
purchase sample for borrowers with subprime credit scores and high debt-to-income 
ratios and in the refinance sample for borrowers with rate spread loans and high 
debt-to-income ratios. Significantly, no racial differences remain for black borrow-
ers who do not have any of these risk factors. For Hispanics, ethnic differences in 
delinquency and foreclosure are larger among borrowers with high debt-to-income 
ratios in both samples, but these effects are smaller than the effects for blacks, and 
most of the ethnic differences observed in Table 3 remain among Hispanic borrow-
ers who do not have any of these risk factors.
Columns 3 and 6 present the results where race and ethnicity are both inter-
acted with one minus the prime age male employment rate, a general unemploy-
ment rate that accounts for both unemployment and labor force participation. For 
both groups, racial and ethnic differences are concentrated among borrowers with 
higher  county-by-group level unemployment rates. However, the ethnic differences 
in the impact of employment rates are significantly larger than the racial differ-
ences. In order to give a sense of the magnitude of these effects, we estimate the 
racial and ethnic differences for borrowers at low risk of unemployment, i.e., when 
the employment rate among prime age males as a share of all prime age males is 
96 percent. At this high employment level, ethnic differences in foreclosure are near 
zero at 0.005 and 0.006 in the home purchase and refinance samples, respectively, 
but racial differences in foreclosure remain significantly higher at 0.029 and 0.011 
for the two samples.
IV. Heterogeneity in Mortgage Outcomes by Year of Origination
This section examines the pattern of delinquency and foreclosure risk based on 
year of origination. First, we restrict the sample to 2008 and 2009 delinquencies and 
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foreclosures in order to focus on the crisis period and to avoid confounding the direct 
effect of origination year with differences that arise because earlier origination years 
allow for foreclosure and delinquency during the pre-crisis period. Table 5 presents 
the unconditional racial and ethnic differences by origination year with 2004 origi-
nations as the omitted category. For home purchase originations, there is a substan-
tial increase in the racial and ethnic differences in foreclosure and delinquency for 
originations between 2005 and 2007 relative to 2004 with the largest differences 
arising for 2006 originations. The pattern for refinance mortgages is less clear with 
substantially smaller and less significant differences in the estimated racial and eth-
nic effects between originations from 2005 to 2007 and originations in 2004, and no 
differences at all in the racial foreclosures differences for refinance mortgages.
As in Figure 2, Figure 3 presents racial and ethnic differences in foreclosure for 
all four model specifications presented in Table 3, except Figure 2 presents racial 
differences by origination year. The top panel of Figure 3 shows the results for 
the home purchase sample. In all models, we get a peak in racial and ethnic dif-
ferences in 2006 at the peak of the housing market. For the final model indicated 
Table 4A—Race and Ethnicity Interactions—Home Purchase Sample
  Delinquency Foreclosure
Race Baseline Risk factor Employment Baseline Risk factor Employment
Black 0.015*** −0.002 −0.005 0.017*** 0.000 −0.001
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Hispanic 0.015*** 0.016*** −0.032*** 0.025*** 0.020*** −0.056***
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Black × Subprime   0.018***     0.035***  
    (0.005)     (0.008)  
Hispanic × Subprime   0.000     0.008  
    (0.004)     (0.007)  
Black × Rate spread   0.006     −0.011  
    (0.004)     (0.007)  
Hispanic × Rate spread   −0.006     0.002  
    (0.003)     (0.005)  
Black × High DTI   0.041***     0.058***  
    (0.006)     (0.009)  
Hispanic × High DTI   0.010**     0.021***  
    (0.004)     (0.007)  
Black × Unemp rate     0.570***     0.754***
      (0.065)     (0.092)
Hispanic × Unemp rate     0.908***     1.521***
      (0.066)     (0.089)
r2 0.102 0.108 0.109 0.137 0.137 0.138
notes: This table presents estimates for delinquency and foreclosure based on the home purchase sample. The 
first column for each outcome presents the final column of estimates from Table 3. The second column presents 
estimates based on the interaction of the dummy variables for race and ethnicity with whether the borrower has a 
Vantage credit score below 701, a loan-to-value ratio above 0.95, or a debt-to-income ratio above 0.45. The third 
column presents estimates using interactions of race and ethnicity with one minus the race-by-year county average 
employment rate for prime age adults. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity, and clus-
tered at tract-credit year level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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by the triangle, these differences arise even after controlling for contemporaneous 
housing prices, and so these results cannot simply be driven by the fact that 2006 
home purchase mortgages exposed homebuyers to the largest declines in housing 
prices relative to the purchase price. Rather, minority homebuyers in 2006 appear to 
be more  vulnerable to the economic downturn than homebuyers in earlier years or 
 homebuyers after the onset of the crisis, even after conditioning on detailed credit 
risk factors associated with the borrower and the mortgage. Panel B of Figure 2 shows 
the results for the refinance sample. As noted above, racial differences in foreclosure 
do not increase for originations in or near 2006. Ethnic differences in foreclosure for 
the refinance sample follow the same pattern as was observed in the home purchase 
sample, but the effects for 2006 are substantially smaller in magnitude.
We next use the refinance sample in order to examine home purchase origina-
tions over a longer timeframe. Specifically, we match refinance mortgages with 
the original home purchases back to 1998, which is the earliest year for which we 
observe home purchases in all seven of our markets. This exercise is imperfect for 
two reasons. First, the sample only considers a select subsample of home purchase 
Table 4B—Race and Ethnicity Interactions—Refinance Sample
Delinquency Foreclosure
Race Baseline Risk factor Employment Baseline Risk factor Employment
Black 0.005** −0.004 −0.019*** 0.007** 0.008** −0.014***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Hispanic 0.011*** 0.011*** −0.035*** 0.019*** 0.014*** −0.032***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.012) (0.002) (0.004)
Black × Subprime 0.004 −0.013**
  (0.004) (0.005)
Hispanic × Subprime 0.004 0.020***
  (0.004) (0.005)
Black × Rate spread 0.010*** 0.002
  (0.003) (0.004)
Hispanic × Rate spread −0.009*** −0.007*
  (0.003) (0.004)
Black × High DTI 0.016*** 0.009*
  (0.004) (0.005)
Hispanic × High DTI 0.007** 0.010**
  (0.003) (0.005)
Black × Unemp rate 0.651*** 0.631***
  (0.066) (0.071)
Hispanic × Unemp rate 0.874*** 0.956***
  (0.065) (0.073)
r2 0.096 0.096 0.097 0.102 0.102 0.103
notes: This table presents estimates for delinquency and foreclosure based on the refinance sample. The first col-
umn for each outcome presents the final column of estimates from Table 3. The second column presents estimates 
based on the interaction of the dummy variables for race and ethnicity with whether the borrower has a Vantage 
credit score below 701, a loan-to-value ratio above 0.95, or a debt-to-income ratio above 0.45. The third column 
presents estimates using interactions of race and ethnicity with one minus the race-by-year county average employ-
ment rate for prime age adults. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity, and clustered at 
tract-credit year level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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 mortgages back to 1998, namely the mortgages for borrowers who chose to refinance 
during our sample period. Second, when borrowers refinance, they have the oppor-
tunity to remove equity using a cash-out refinance, and a large share of  refinance 
mortgages were used to extract equity in the lead up to the crisis (Demyanyk and 
Van Hemert 2011). While we can do nothing to address the first concern, we did 
conduct supplementary analyses where we split the refinance sample based on our 
best proxy for equity extraction, i.e., the ratio of the total mortgage amount taken 
out during the refinance to the outstanding mortgage debt observed in the March 31 
credit report right prior to the refinance. The results of those estimations are shown 
in Appendix Tables A4 and A5.
Table 5—Estimated Differences in Mortgage Outcomes by Origination Year
Race and ethnicity Delinquency Foreclosure
interactions Black Hispanic Black Hispanic
Home purchase sample
Level estimate 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.086*** 0.104***
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009)
2008 −0.031*** −0.026*** −0.055*** −0.066***
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010)
2007 0.017** 0.038*** 0.000 0.035***
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.012)
2006 0.054*** 0.051*** 0.091*** 0.108***
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.012)
2005 0.027*** 0.034*** 0.033** 0.057***
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011)
Sample size 0.027 0.035
r2 207,723 207,723
refinance sample
Level estimate 0.038*** 0.044*** 0.051*** 0.059***
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
2008 −0.022*** −0.023*** −0.051*** −0.046***
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
2007 −0.002 0.015** −0.027*** −0.002
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
2006 0.020*** 0.018*** −0.009 0.035***
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
2005 0.010 0.007 −0.003 0.024***
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Sample size 0.011 0.012
r2 192,953 192,953
notes: This table presents estimates for a model where mortgage origination year is interacted 
with race and ethnicity to explain delinquency and foreclosure for the home purchase and refi-
nance samples. The first column for each outcome presents the estimates for origination year 
interacted with whether the borrower is black, and the second column presents the estimates 
for origination year interacted with whether Hispanic. The row labelled level estimate presents 
the estimate on the dummy variable for black or Hispanic. The omitted category is all mort-
gages underwritten in 2004. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity, 
and clustered at tract-credit year level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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In Table 6, we present the unconditional racial and ethnic differences in foreclo-
sure by home purchase year relative to mortgage refinancing for homes purchased 
prior to 2008. While the sample represents only home purchases that selected into 
refinance, and our econometric specification must control for credit scores observed 
after the home purchase, our estimates demonstrate the significance of purchase 
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Figure 3. Black and Hispanic Probability of Foreclosure Relative to Whites by Loan Origination Year, 
Home Purchase, and Refinance Samples
notes: The figure presents estimated group differences in the number of foreclosures within the last 12 months by 
mortgage origination year separately for the home purchase and refinance samples. Each line represents the esti-
mated differences for a unique model based on a specific set of regression controls as discussed in relation to Table 3.
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year  coefficients are relatively flat for the first three years of the sample 1998 to 
2000. After 2000, we see substantially larger racial and ethnic differences in foreclo-
sures for homes that were originally purchased closer to the boom, and the largest 
differences arise between 2004 and 2006. Unexpectedly, racial and ethnic differ-
ences drop for home purchases in 2006 relative to 2005 and 2007, except for the 
racial  differences in delinquency. We do not have any explanation for this anomaly. 
Figure 4 presents the racial and ethnic differences by home purchase year for all 
four models. As before, the basic pattern of results is robust to including controls 
for mortgage-risk factors, contemporaneous employment risk, and levels of negative 
equity. The findings are also robust across subsamples based on the ratio of the new 
mortgage amount to the outstanding original mortgage balance prior to the refinance.
Table 6—Estimated Differences in Mortgage Outcomes by Home  
Purchase Year—Refinance Sample
Delinquency Foreclosure
Ethnicity interactions Black Hispanic Black Hispanic
Level 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.052***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
2008 0.038 −0.034 −0.051*** −0.052***
(0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.019)
2007 0.037 0.041* 0.046 0.088**
(0.003) (0.025) (0.036) (0.041)
2006 0.017 0.049*** 0.01 0.015
(0.015) (0.014) (0.022) (0.017)
2005 0.027** 0.038*** 0.029** 0.050***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.014) (0.011)
2004 0.037*** 0.028*** 0.020* 0.057***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010)
2003 0.021** 0.023*** 0.018 0.024**
(0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010)
2002 0.015* 0.025*** 0.015 0.019*
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
2001 0.035*** 0.004 0.006 0.016
(0.012) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011)
2000 0.004 −0.003 −0.004 −0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
1999 0.008 −0.009 0.014 −0.009
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010)
1998 0.009 0.003 −0.008 −0.005
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Sample size 192,953 192,953
r2 0.012 0.012
notes: This table presents estimates based on the refinance sample for a model where home 
purchase year is interacted with race and ethnicity to explain delinquency and foreclosure. 
The first column for each outcome presents the estimates for home purchase year interacted 
with whether the borrower is black, and the second column presents the estimates for origi-
nation year interacted with whether Hispanic. The omitted category is all homes purchased 
prior to 1998. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity, and clustered 
at  tract-credit year level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
22 AmEricAn Economic JoUrnAL: Economic PoLicy fEBrUAry 2016
Finally, following up on the analyses in Table 4, we examine the effect of home 
purchase year for borrowers with key risk factors by interacting year of home pur-
chase with either a dummy variable for whether the borrower has a high debt-to-
income ratio or with the race and year specific unemployment rate for the county in 
which the borrower resides. These results are shown in Table 7 for the home  purchase 
sample and in Table 8 for the refinance sample. In the home purchase sample, both 
blacks and Hispanics have larger racial and ethnic differences in delinquency and 
foreclosure in 2005 and 2006 if they had high debt-to-income ratios with the effects 
being largest in 2006, and Hispanics have larger ethnic differences in delinquency 
and foreclosure after 2004 if they were exposed to high unemployment rates with 
the effects being largest in 2006 and 2007. Similarly for the refinance sample, the 
effect of having a high debt-to-income ratio on racial and ethnic differences in delin-
quency and foreclosure tends to be largest for homes purchased between 2001 and 
2005, and the effect of exposure to high unemployment rates on racial and ethnic 
differences tends to be highest for homes purchased between 2002 and 2007.
Overall, these results corroborate the intuition presented in the introduction. As 
credit expanded during the housing boom, households with higher unobserved risk 
of defaults and delinquencies entered the housing market and, empirically, black 
and Hispanic borrowers were much more likely to be in this group. The selection 
of these especially high-risk households into the market translated into much higher 
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Figure 4. Black and Hispanic Probability of Foreclosure Relative to Whites  
by Home Purchase Year of Refinance Loan
notes: The figure presents estimated group differences in the number of foreclosures within the last 12 months by 
the year of home purchase for the refinance sample. Each line represents the estimated differences for a unique 
model based on a specific set of regression controls as discussed in relation to Table 3.
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V. Summary and Conclusion
In this paper, we identify large racial and ethnic differences in the likelihood of 
mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures in the recent housing market bust and asso-
ciated recession. Substantial differences remain after controlling for the borrower, 
home, loan, and market attributes, including the individual’s credit score, that would 
have been observed by lenders ex ante; differences in lenders, neighborhoods, or the 
significance of loan attributes that might be associated with subprime lending; and 
ex post measures of exposure to local housing and labor market shocks. Collectively, 
these results imply that the relatively poor mortgage outcomes for minority bor-
rowers are not simply a function of greater participation in the  subprime sector or 
greater exposure to neighborhood housing price declines or unemployment rates.
Table 7—Estimated Differences in Mortgage Outcomes by Origination Year  
and Risk Factors
Race and ethnicity Delinquency Foreclosure
interactions Black Hispanic Black Hispanic
Panel A. Home purchase sample—debt-to-income interactions
2008 −0.029 0.033** −0.097*** −0.080***
  (0.020) (0.015) (0.035) (0.023)
2007 −0.016 0.028* −0.079** −0.006
  (0.020) (0.015) (0.035) (0.025)
2006 0.050** 0.061*** 0.179*** 0.158***
  (0.023) (0.017) (0.043) (0.033)
2005 0.032 0.045*** 0.085* 0.076***
  (0.026) (0.018) (0.046) (0.028)
Sample size 207,241 207,241
r2 0.139 0.184
Panel B. Home purchase sample—unemployment rate interactions
2008 0.011 0.213 −0.286 0.498***
  (0.113) (0.142) (0.182) (0.187)
2007 −0.101 0.960*** −0.198 1.195***
  (0.114) (0.153) (0.184) (0.207)
2006 −0.128 0.498*** −0.003 1.212***
  (0.126) (0.155) (0.213) (0.233)
2005 −0.218* 0.291* -0.151 0.426**
  (0.124) (0.156) (0.204) (0.204)
Sample size 207,241 207,241
r2 0.139 0.182
notes: This table presents estimates based on the home purchase sample for a model where 
the interactions between home purchase year and the race and ethnicity dummy variables are 
interacted with mortgage risk factors, high debt-to-income ratio dummy (panel A) or exposure 
to unemployment rates by race by current year-by-county (panel B). The first column for each 
outcome presents the estimates for home purchase year interacted with whether the borrower 
is black and with the risk factor, and the second column presents the estimates for origination 
year interacted with whether Hispanic and the risk factor. The omitted category is homes pur-
chased or mortgages originated in 2004. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to het-
eroskedasticity, and clustered at tract-credit year level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Finally, these differences are concentrated among borrowers who may have dif-
ficulty making mortgage payments during the crisis. Blacks and Hispanics with 
high debt payment to income ratios have larger racial and ethnic differences in 
 delinquencies and foreclosures, and in fact, black borrowers who do not have risk 
factors of this type are no more likely to have a delinquency or foreclosure than 
white borrowers. Also, blacks and Hispanics experience much larger increases in 
delinquency and foreclosure rates as county employment rates fall during the crisis 
than are experienced by equivalent white borrowers. These effects are largest for 
Hispanics, and we do not find any ethnic differences in delinquency and foreclosure 
in counties and years with relatively high employment rates for Hispanics.
A further decomposition of our main findings by origination year reveals that 
the large estimated racial and ethnic differences in mortgage outcomes are concen-
trated in mortgages that were originated in 2005 through 2007. That is, black and 
Table 8A—Differences by Home Purchase Year and DTI—Refinance Sample
Race and ethnicity Delinquency Foreclosure
interactions Black Hispanic Black Hispanic
2008 −0.052 0.015 −0.084* −0.21
  (0.088) (0.072) (0.045) (0.131)
2007 0.015 0.041 −0.035 −0.143**
  (0.065) (0.059) (0.086) (0.067)
2006 0.036 0.047 0.02 0.037
  (0.035) (0.029) (0.044) (0.030)
2005 0.077*** 0.055*** 0.045 0.063***
  (0.026) (0.018) (0.033) (0.024)
2004 0.049** 0.022 0.004 0.061**
  (0.020) (0.014) (0.023) (0.026)
2003 0.042* 0.007 0.004 0.033
  (0.024) (0.016) (0.022) (0.024)
2002 0.017 0.016 0.04 0.026
  (0.020) (0.019) (0.026) (0.028)
2001 0.057* 0.019 0.018 0.047*
  (0.030) (0.017) (0.024) (0.029)
2000 −0.002 −0.006 −0.033 0.020
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023)
1999 −0.049*** −0.026* 0.009 −0.016
  (0.017) (0.015) (0.024) (0.022)
1998 0.014 0.046** −0.028 0.028
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.020) (0.027)
Sample size 192,444 192,444
r2 0.131 0.144
notes: This table presents estimates based on the refinance sample for a model where the inter-
actions between home purchase year and the race and ethnicity dummy variables are inter-
acted with mortgage risk factors, high debt-to-income ratio dummy. The first column for each 
outcome presents the estimates for home purchase year interacted with whether the borrower 
is black and with the risk factor, and the second column presents the estimates for origination 
year interacted with whether Hispanic and the risk factor. The omitted category is homes pur-
chased prior to 1998. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity, and 
clustered at tract-credit year level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Hispanic households drawn into homeownership at the peak of the credit expansion 
and housing boom were especially likely to subsequently become delinquent and 
default on their mortgages. This finding is again robust to the inclusion of a broad 
set of controls for borrower, lender, loan, and neighborhood attributes, as well as 
controls for contemporaneous risk factors. This finding is also observed over a lon-
ger time period when examining racial differences by year of home purchase in the 
refinance sample. And these effects are more pronounced for borrowers with high 
 debt-to-income ratios or with exposure to lower employment rates.
The simple idea discussed earlier that forward-looking borrowers sort into home-
ownership in part based on their risk of experiencing adverse future events high-
lights a potential unified explanation for the full set of empirical results.  African 
Americans and Hispanic borrowers appear to be much more vulnerable to changes 
in market employment rates, declines in housing prices and having originally high 
debt-expense-to-income ratios. African American and Hispanic  homebuyers near 
Table 8B—Differences by Home Purchase Year and DTI—Refinance Sample
Race and ethnicity Delinquency Foreclosure
interactions Black Hispanic Black Hispanic
2008 0.287 0.012 0.360 0.161
  (0.425) (0.161) (0.464) (0.298)
2007 0.758* 0.138 0.915 −0.447
  (0.395) (0.833) (0.686) (1.081)
2006 0.165 0.751** 0.803* 0.387
  (0.241) (0.332) (0.418) (0.250)
2005 0.276 0.858*** 0.728*** 1.061***
  (0.189) (0.215) (0.268) (0.257)
2004 0.459*** 0.380** 0.320* 0.570***
  (0.157) (0.169) (0.176) (0.193)
2003 −0.040 0.472** 0.251 0.131
  (0.186) (0.206) (0.169) (0.216)
2002 0.108 0.158 −0.103 0.609**
  (0.136) (0.208) (0.166) (0.269)
2001 0.335 −0.083 −0.102 0.140
  (0.305) (0.179) (0.174) (0.242)
2000 0.116 0.118 0.081 0.334
  (0.150) (0.241) (0.179) (0.249)
1999 0.063 0.040 0.158 −0.124
  (0.175) (0.188) (0.188) (0.228)
1998 −0.184 −0.004 −0.010 0.531*
  (0.184) (0.252) (0.157) (0.293)
Sample size 192,444 192,444
r2 0.131 0.144
notes: This table presents estimates based on the refinance sample for a model where the inter-
actions between home purchase year and exposure to unemployment rates by race by current 
year-by-county. The first column for each outcome presents the estimates for home purchase 
year interacted with whether the borrower is black and with the risk factor, and the second col-
umn presents the estimates for origination year interacted with whether Hispanic and the risk 
factor. The omitted category is homes purchased prior to 1998. Standard errors (in parenthe-
ses) are robust to heteroskedasticity, and clustered at tract-credit year level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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the peak of the housing market and the credit market expansion have the highest 
foreclosure rates during the crisis, and these high rates cannot be explained by the 
higher rates on negative equity experienced by borrowers who took out loans when 
housing prices were at their peak.
Our results complement a recent literature that aims to understand the causes and 
consequences of the last housing cycle. For example, while Mian and Sufi (2009) 
demonstrate a significant role for subprime lending in explaining overall neighbor-
hood level foreclosure rates, our analysis implies that subprime lending can explain 
at most a modest fraction of observed racial and ethnic differences in credit market 
outcomes. In addition, tighter underwriting standards and increased financial over-
sight arising from recent financial reforms are unlikely to address these concerns 
because the observed differences arise after controlling for all traditional under-
writing variables, are based on comparisons within lenders and neighborhoods, and 
occur across a broad spectrum of minority borrowers.
Finally, regardless of the ultimate explanation for the observed higher rates of 
negative mortgage outcomes, our study raises serious concerns about homeowner-
ship as a vehicle for reducing racial-wealth disparities. Our findings suggest instead 
that homeownership may be especially risky for households with a low initial level 
of wealth (savings) or fewer family resources on which to draw when hit with an 
adverse economic shock. Because delinquencies and default have consequences that 
go beyond the direct loss of housing equity/wealth, they can contribute substan-
tially to perpetuating the wealth gap across generations. The increased cost of all 
subsequent borrowing (through the lower credit scores), in particular, makes future 
wealth accumulation much more difficult.
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